omniroute-integration

Fail

Audited by Snyk on May 16, 2026

Risk Level: CRITICAL
Full Analysis

CRITICAL E004: Prompt injection detected in skill instructions.

  • Potential prompt injection detected (high risk: 0.80). The prompt includes a persona that explicitly impersonates a real authority figure ("Sam Altman" with CEO/OpenAI credentials), which is a deceptive instruction to adopt an authoritative identity unrelated to the OmniRoute integration's stated purpose.

HIGH W007: Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.

  • Insecure credential handling detected (high risk: 0.80). The prompt includes explicit curl examples and instructions to add Authorization headers like -H "Authorization: Bearer your-key" and references JWT_SECRET/provider OAuth credentials, which encourages embedding user API keys/tokens verbatim in commands or outputs and thus enables secret exfiltration risk.

MEDIUM W013: Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions.

  • Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions detected (high risk: 0.80). The prompt explicitly instructs privileged system operations (e.g., "sudo systemctl start/stop/status", "sudo journalctl -u ...", checking/repairing system database files and permissions) that modify service state and require sudo, so it encourages changing the machine's state.

Issues (3)

E004
CRITICAL

Prompt injection detected in skill instructions.

W007
HIGH

Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.

W013
MEDIUM

Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions.

Audit Metadata
Risk Level
CRITICAL
Analyzed
May 16, 2026, 06:13 AM
Issues
3
Security Audit — snyk — omniroute-integration