asyncapi-generator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill analyzes untrusted codebases which may contain malicious instructions embedded in comments or data structures designed to influence the agent's output.\n
- Ingestion points: Codebase files located within the user-provided
<service-root>.\n - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions in the analyzed files.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill executes CLI tools (
ripwire,asyncapi), reads multiple file types (source code, YAML, JSON, .env), and writes a generated specification file.\n - Sanitization: There is no explicit sanitization of extracted content before it is included in the generated AsyncAPI YAML.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands using the
ripwireandasyncapiutilities, passing them user-provided directory and file paths.\n - Evidence: Step 1 and Step 7 in
SKILL.mdinvolve runningripwire <service-root>andasyncapi validate <file>respectively.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill recommends usingnpx @asyncapi/clifor validation, which involves fetching the package from the public npm registry.\n - Evidence:
SKILL.mdsuggests validating the generated spec usingnpx @asyncapi/cliif the local CLI is unavailable. This targets a well-known service (npm) and a recognized technology organization (AsyncAPI).
Audit Metadata