recall
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it is designed to ingest and summarize large volumes of historical and external data which may contain adversarial instructions. \n- Ingestion points: Identified in SKILL.md, the agent retrieves data from the transcript API, repository history, issue trackers, user reports, and chat channels.\n- Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit boundary delimiters or specific warnings to ignore instructions embedded within the retrieved historical data.\n- Capability inventory: The skill interacts with the local system using git and gh commands and leverages other skills like why and unslop.\n- Sanitization: While the skill mentions sanitizing private context before output, it lacks logic to sanitize or filter potential instructions found within input data from logs or reports.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell-based development tools to synchronize with the current project state.\n- Evidence: The instructions in SKILL.md (Step 5) direct the agent to run git and gh to check the status of pull requests, branches, and tickets surfaced during the recall process.
Audit Metadata