totp-mcp-server

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 26, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [UNVERIFIABLE_DEPENDENCIES_AND_REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill uses Python's subprocess.run to interact with host-level keychain management utilities like security (macOS) and secret-tool (Linux).
  • The code uses a list-based argument format for subprocess calls, which avoids shell invocation and prevents shell injection attacks.
  • The account parameter, which is received as tool input from the model, is strictly validated against a known list of accounts retrieved from the backend before being used in any command line arguments.
  • The server specifies a dependency on the mcp library via PEP 723 metadata, which is pinned to a major version and sourced from a standard registry.
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE_AND_EXFILTRATION]: The skill handles sensitive TOTP secrets and generates one-time codes for authentication.
  • The server is designed to act as a secure boundary, ensuring that seeds (secrets) remain stored locally in the system keychain or a restricted directory (~/.config/totp/) and never appear in the model's context or audit logs.
  • Audit logs are stored in a dedicated directory with strict file permissions (0700) to prevent unauthorized local access.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documentation explicitly identifies and addresses the risk of indirect prompt injection, referred to as the "code oracle" threat.
  • It provides clear guidance for users to maintain manual-approval workflows for tool calls and uses code-level allowlists that persist even if model-facing instructions are ignored.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 26, 2026, 11:53 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — totp-mcp-server