totp-mcp-server
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [UNVERIFIABLE_DEPENDENCIES_AND_REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill uses Python's
subprocess.runto interact with host-level keychain management utilities likesecurity(macOS) andsecret-tool(Linux). - The code uses a list-based argument format for subprocess calls, which avoids shell invocation and prevents shell injection attacks.
- The
accountparameter, which is received as tool input from the model, is strictly validated against a known list of accounts retrieved from the backend before being used in any command line arguments. - The server specifies a dependency on the
mcplibrary via PEP 723 metadata, which is pinned to a major version and sourced from a standard registry. - [DATA_EXPOSURE_AND_EXFILTRATION]: The skill handles sensitive TOTP secrets and generates one-time codes for authentication.
- The server is designed to act as a secure boundary, ensuring that seeds (secrets) remain stored locally in the system keychain or a restricted directory (~/.config/totp/) and never appear in the model's context or audit logs.
- Audit logs are stored in a dedicated directory with strict file permissions (0700) to prevent unauthorized local access.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documentation explicitly identifies and addresses the risk of indirect prompt injection, referred to as the "code oracle" threat.
- It provides clear guidance for users to maintain manual-approval workflows for tool calls and uses code-level allowlists that persist even if model-facing instructions are ignored.
Audit Metadata