illustration-draw
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests user-provided text from a brief and interpolates it into a prompt sent to a secondary AI agent via the acpx tool. This creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection attacks where malicious instructions in the brief could influence the generated output.
- Ingestion points: The
scripts/spawn_drawer.pyscript reads text from a user-specified brief file. - Boundary markers: The interpolation prompt uses triple-dash delimiters (
---) to separate the brief from the system instructions. - Capability inventory: The secondary agent is executed with the
--deny-allflag and constrained to an empty temporary directory, limiting its ability to interact with the host system. - Sanitization: The skill extracts the resulting JSON specification using a dedicated extraction function that validates the structural integrity of the response.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation suggests installing the diagram-review skill using
npx skills add Paldom/diagram-skills. This is a reference to a resource within the author's own ecosystem. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.runto call the local Graphvizdotutility for diagram layout and theacpxCLI for agent communication. These executions are intended for core functionality and are performed within a restricted context where applicable. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
scripts/gemini_icon.pyscript transmits prompt data to Google's Generative Language API. This is an optional feature for generating custom icons and targets a well-known service.
Audit Metadata