landing-page-copywriting
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because its core workflow involves ingesting and processing untrusted third-party data such as customer reviews, support tickets, and community forum threads.
- Ingestion points: External text from reviews and transcripts is brought into the agent context in the 'Mine before you write' step described in
SKILL.mdandreferences/copywriting-playbook.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack specific guidance on using delimiters (e.g., XML tags or triple quotes) or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings when processing this data.
- Capability inventory: The skill's primary function is text generation; it does not explicitly request or use capabilities for file writing, system command execution, or network exfiltration.
- Sanitization: There is no mention of filtering or sanitizing the customer-sourced text before the agent uses it to draft headlines and copy.
Audit Metadata