council
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill takes user input via the
QUESTIONargument and can ingest local files through the--context-fileflag. This content is passed to multiple LLMs for synthesis, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection where adversarial instructions in the data could influence the final verdict. - Ingestion points:
QUESTIONcommand-line argument and content from files specified by the--context-fileargument. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or safety instructions are defined in the skill text to separate user data from the system instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill executes the
uv run researchkitcommand, which involves network communication with LLM providers and file system reads. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of the input data is described.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of
uv run researchkitin the shell. While this is the primary intended mechanism of the skill, it assumes that the localresearchkitrepository is trusted and that theuvtool is installed in the environment.
Audit Metadata