alignfirst-coaching
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/alignfirst-agent.mjsusesspawnSyncto execute theclaudeCLI. It dynamically constructs command-line arguments using input from the--message,--protocol, and--ticketflags, which creates a surface for command manipulation. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script includes logic to bypass user confirmation for the underlying agent. If the
ALIGNFIRST_AGENT_SKIP_PERMISSIONSenvironment variable is set, the script executesclaudewith the--dangerously-skip-permissionsflag, allowing the agent to perform potentially destructive operations without human oversight. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates indirect prompt injection by acting as a conduit for user messages to an underlying AI agent. The wrapper script passes raw, unsanitized user input directly to the
claudeagent, which may then execute instructions contained within that message. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The script captures and logs all inputs and agent outputs to a directory specified by the
ALIGNFIRST_AGENT_LOG_DIRenvironment variable. This practice results in the plain-text exposure of user messages, project details, and agent findings on the local file system.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata