alignfirst-openclaw-playbook

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill collects arbitrary text from user messages, such as tasks, requests, and consultation questions, and interpolates them into markdown templates used to prompt a secondary coding agent (alcode).
  • Ingestion points: User messages triaged in references/channel-handling.md, request capture in references/working-session.md, and questions in references/runbooks/consultation.md.
  • Boundary markers: Relies on simple text labels (e.g., 'Task:', 'Request:') within markdown files to delimit user-provided content.
  • Capability inventory: Uses the exec tool to perform sensitive operations including filesystem writes, repository management via git, and executing the alcode coding agent which can modify the codebase.
  • Sanitization: User-provided text and resource URLs are preserved verbatim without sanitization or escaping.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill allows cloning repositories from arbitrary, user-provided URLs as part of the onboarding process.
  • Evidence: The references/runbooks/project-lifecycle.md file defines a procedure to clone a repository URL provided by the user into the project environment.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of multiple local CLI tools to perform its intended functions.
  • Evidence: Extensive use of the exec tool to run git, alproject, alcode, alignfirst, and openclaw commands is documented across all instruction files.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 25, 2026, 05:32 PM