alignfirst-openclaw-playbook
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill collects arbitrary text from user messages, such as tasks, requests, and consultation questions, and interpolates them into markdown templates used to prompt a secondary coding agent (alcode).
- Ingestion points: User messages triaged in
references/channel-handling.md, request capture inreferences/working-session.md, and questions inreferences/runbooks/consultation.md. - Boundary markers: Relies on simple text labels (e.g., 'Task:', 'Request:') within markdown files to delimit user-provided content.
- Capability inventory: Uses the
exectool to perform sensitive operations including filesystem writes, repository management viagit, and executing thealcodecoding agent which can modify the codebase. - Sanitization: User-provided text and resource URLs are preserved verbatim without sanitization or escaping.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill allows cloning repositories from arbitrary, user-provided URLs as part of the onboarding process.
- Evidence: The
references/runbooks/project-lifecycle.mdfile defines a procedure to clone a repository URL provided by the user into the project environment. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of multiple local CLI tools to perform its intended functions.
- Evidence: Extensive use of the
exectool to rungit,alproject,alcode,alignfirst, andopenclawcommands is documented across all instruction files.
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