openclaw-coder-playbook
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 19, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to read
DEVELOPMENT.mdto identify specific commands for workspace management (e.g.,workspace --guide). The agent is then directed to execute these commands found in the file. Since project files are external and potentially untrusted, this creates a mechanism for arbitrary command execution. - Evidence:
references/project-workspace-setup.mddirects the agent to read~/projects/{PROJECT_NAME}/DEVELOPMENT.mdto find the project's guide command and instructions for listing and setting up workspaces, and explicitly tells the agent to "Use them". - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from project-level files and uses them as primary instructions for the
alcodeagent, which possesses high-privilege capabilities. -
- Ingestion points: The agent reads content from
DEVELOPMENT.md,README.md,AGENTS.md,*spec.md, and*summary.mdwithin the~/projects/directory.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads content from
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- Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions explicitly state that the playbook "tells you what to do. Do not improvise," which increases the likelihood of the agent following malicious instructions embedded in these files.
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- Capability inventory: The skill has extensive capabilities, including file system access, shell execution via the
exectool, and interaction with GitHub/GitLab throughghandglabCLI tools.
- Capability inventory: The skill has extensive capabilities, including file system access, shell execution via the
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- Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of validation or filtering for the content retrieved from external project files before it is processed or used to drive agent actions.
Audit Metadata