grilling
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection through its ingestion of external configuration files.
- Ingestion points: It reads instructions from the target repository's
agent-instructionsfile and preference data frompreferences.md(referenced inSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: There are no documented delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within these external files in
SKILL.md. - Capability inventory: The agent can perform git operations (
clone,push) and write to local filesystem artifacts like design documents or specifications (SKILL.md). - Sanitization: The skill lacks explicit sanitization or validation of the content retrieved from external files.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs shell-level operations to manage decision memory.
- Evidence: Instructions include performing a
shallow-cloneof the target repository at session start and apushof session records as a Pull Request at session end (SKILL.md). - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches data from an external repository provided by the user.
- Evidence: The skill is instructed to clone the repository specified in the
DECISION_MEMORY_URLenvironment variable (SKILL.md).
Audit Metadata