writing-prose
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and review untrusted text such as pull request bodies, tickets, and code comments. This processing loop creates a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads external text files or standard input through the
check.shscript, which is then processed bypatterns.awk. - Boundary markers: The scripts and instructions do not define clear boundary markers or "ignore" instructions to separate the prose being reviewed from the agent's operational instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
check.shto execute a local AWK script (patterns.awk) which performs file reads and pattern matching. The agent uses the output of these tools to make decisions on rewriting content. - Sanitization: While
patterns.awkcontains a whitelist for specific HTML tags in thetracker_placeholdersfunction, there is no general sanitization of the input text to prevent malicious instructions embedded in the prose from influencing the agent's reasoning. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
check.shscript accepts a--beforeargument which is passed to the AWK script. The AWK script usesgetline line < beforeto read the entire content of the specified file for comparison purposes. In an adversarial scenario, an agent could be manipulated via prompt injection to provide sensitive system file paths (e.g., SSH keys or configuration files) to this argument, leading to the exposure of that data within the agent's context and findings.
Audit Metadata