briefing-daily
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 20, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands using
git loginSKILL.md(Step 3) andreferences/daily-detail.md. These commands interpolate variables<N>(card number) and<slug>(branch/slug name) which are derived from external data sources like GitHub, Linear, or Jira. If an attacker controls the card title or branch name, they could inject shell commands into the execution context. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted data from external sources to generate summaries and recommendations.
- Ingestion points: Card data (title, status, comments) returned by the
read_boardaction inSKILL.mdStep 1. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any delimiters or safety prompts to isolate external data from the core logic.
- Capability inventory: Shell execution via
git logand the ability to trigger other mutating skills likeboard-superpowers:intaking-requirement. - Sanitization: There is no mention of input validation or character escaping for data retrieved from the project management tools.
Audit Metadata