opencode-configure
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides configuration examples that allow the agent to execute shell commands via the
bashtool. This includes broad patterns likenpm *andgit *. Additionally, it documents custom formatters that can run arbitrary CLI tools usingnpx(e.g.,["npx", "prettier", "--write", "$FILE"]). - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The configuration reference includes patterns for variable substitution that point to sensitive file paths, specifically providing an example for reading a secret key from
{file:~/.secrets/anthropic-key}. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation describes setting up Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers, which can involve downloading and executing packages from external registries (e.g.,
npx -y @org/package) or connecting to remote URLs for server functionality. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: By supporting remote MCP servers (
type: "remote") and user-defined executable formatters, the skill establishes a configuration path that could allow for remote code execution if configured with untrusted sources. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill manages behavioral instructions in
AGENTS.mdand runtime settings inopencode.json, which are processed by the agent and could serve as an injection surface. - Ingestion points:
opencode.json,AGENTS.md, and environment variables referenced in configuration. - Boundary markers: None explicitly defined in the provided examples to delimit instructions from potentially untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: Full shell access (
bash), file modification (edit,write), and network fetching (webfetch,remote MCP). - Sanitization: The skill advises using restrictive permissions (e.g., denying
sudo) and environment variables for secrets, but does not provide specific sanitization logic for data processed within the configuration files.
Audit Metadata