opencode-design-commands

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION]: The skill documents and encourages the use of a dynamic context injection feature using the !cmd syntax. This allows shell commands to be executed automatically when a command template is loaded, with the output injected directly into the agent's prompt.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md and references/frontmatter-reference.md describe the use of !`command` to fetch live project state (e.g., git log, git status).
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides examples of arbitrary shell command execution. Specifically, it demonstrates a pattern where user input is directly embedded into a shell command string, which is a classic command injection vector.
  • Evidence: In references/command-patterns.md, the /issues example uses the pattern !`gh issue list --search "$ARGUMENTS" --limit 10`. If the $ARGUMENTS placeholder is not sanitized by the execution environment, a user could execute unauthorized commands by including shell metacharacters in their input.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the creation of workflows that ingest untrusted data from external sources, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: External data enters the agent context through shell command outputs (!cmd) and project file inclusions (@filename).
  • Boundary markers: The instructions recommend using XML blocks (e.g., <context>, <target>, <objective>) to organize data, which provides some structural separation but does not prevent the agent from following instructions embedded within the ingested data.
  • Capability inventory: Commands created using this skill can have full read, write, and execute permissions (the default 'build' agent setting).
  • Sanitization: The skill does not provide instructions or best practices for sanitizing or escaping the content of these external data sources before they are processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 7, 2026, 06:04 AM