probe
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
Bashtool to perform experiments during its execution phase. This is the intended primary function of the skill. Security is maintained through a mandatory Phase 1 qualification step where the agent must summarize constraints and steps for the user's explicit approval before any execution occurs.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is exposed to untrusted input through$ARGUMENTS, stateful handoff files, and project code read during probing. Evidence chain: (1) Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters via$ARGUMENTSand handoff file loading in Phase 1; (2) Boundary markers: Mandatory plan presentation (step 1.4) and a human-in-the-loop entry gate (step 1.5) serve as checkpoints; (3) Capability inventory: UsesBash,Write,Task, andWebFetchfor operation; (4) Sanitization: Relies on human review of the plan at the gate before Phase 2 begins. This structure reduces the likelihood of the agent autonomously executing malicious instructions embedded in project data.\n- [SAFE]: Documentation includes comprehensive security orientations, prohibiting production traffic usage and irreversible actions. Functional anti-patterns are clearly defined with 'WHY' explanations. A defensive check for theAskUserQuestionharness bug is implemented to prevent the agent from proceeding without valid user input. The skill's external references point to official vendor repositories on GitHub.
Audit Metadata