sci-data-extractor
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes scientific PDF papers which are untrusted inputs. Maliciously crafted content within these documents could potentially influence the LLM's behavior during the extraction process.
- Ingestion points: The
scripts/extractor.pyscript reads the content of local PDF files using either thePyMuPDFlibrary or theMathpixAPI. - Boundary markers: In
scripts/extractor.py, the extracted content is interpolated into the LLM prompt using triple-quote delimiters ('''{\"\"\" {content} \"\"\"}'''). This provides a basic level of separation but may be bypassable by content containing specifically crafted escape sequences. - Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Bash,Read, andWritetools; it writes extracted data to the local filesystem using theOutputHandler.save_outputmethod. - Sanitization: While the script includes a
remove_referencesmethod to strip bibliography sections, it does not perform sanitization to detect or filter potential prompt injection instructions within the document text. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill communicates with external APIs to perform its primary functions.
- Evidence:
scripts/extractor.pysends PDF data toapi.mathpix.comfor OCR and utilizes theopenaiPython client to send extracted text to LLM endpoints (defaulting to Anthropic's API). These are well-known technology services required for the skill's stated purpose. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides Python scripts designed to be executed via the
Bashtool to automate scientific research workflows. - Evidence: The skill includes
scripts/extractor.pyandscripts/batch_extract.pywhich are invoked by the agent to process files and save results to the filesystem.
Audit Metadata