vault-capture
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary purpose is to ingest untrusted data from the user conversation and process it via a shell command, creating a vulnerability surface for injection.
- Ingestion points: User-provided text (decisions, preferences, insights) is captured from the conversation and used as the
<memory content>value in thevault-cli capturecommand described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or instructions telling the agent to treat the captured string as non-executable data or to ignore embedded shell instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
Bashtool to executevault-cli, providing a mechanism for command execution. - Sanitization: The instructions specifically recommend using double quotes (
--text "<content>") to handle apostrophes. However, in most shell environments, double quotes allow for command substitution (e.g.,$(...)or`...`) and variable expansion, which the instructions do not address or mitigate. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on constructing and executing shell commands that include user-supplied strings. The lack of specific sanitization or escaping guidance for the agent when handling these strings creates a risk of command injection if a user provides input containing shell metacharacters like semicolons, pipes, or command substitution markers.
Audit Metadata