create-external-bot-integration
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines a framework for ingesting data from external agents, which naturally creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions could be embedded in bot-provided content.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the Paperclip context via external bot tool calls (e.g.,
paperclip_dot_tool) and signed events (e.g.,mailbox_updated), which are then processed by the Runner (SKILL.md, runner-architecture.md). - Boundary markers: The skill provides specific instruction templates in
onboarding-and-prompts.mddesigned to constrain bot behavior and clearly separate Paperclip-authorized operations from the bot's native capabilities. - Capability inventory: Implementation involves executing shell commands for testing and history (
pnpm,git), network health checks (curl), and file system operations for task documentation (SKILL.md, conformance-tests.md, troubleshooting-and-deployment.md). - Sanitization: Security guidelines in
runner-architecture.mdmandate that filenames and contents from external bots be treated as untrusted data, and the avatar management section (onboarding-and-prompts.md) specifies re-encoding of images to strip metadata. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for executing local shell-based tools for development, testing, and deployment.
- Evidence: Mentions running
pnpm exec vitestfor conformance testing and executingscripts/deploy-stack.mjsto orchestrate Cloud deployments (conformance-tests.md, troubleshooting-and-deployment.md). These represent standard operations within the vendor's development environment.
Audit Metadata