release-changelog
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from external sources which could contain malicious instructions designed to alter the agent's output or influence its actions.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads data from Git commit messages (
git log), merged pull request titles and bodies (gh pr list), and changeset markdown files (.changeset/*.md) in Step 2 and Step 3. - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not define clear delimiters or provide the agent with "ignore embedded instructions" warnings when processing the raw git and PR data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write files to the local filesystem (within the
releases/directory) and perform network operations via API calls to upsert "Cases" (POST /api/companies/:companyId/casesandPUT /api/cases/:releaseCaseId/documents/body). - Sanitization: The skill provides logic to exclude specific bot accounts and a list of excluded usernames, and explicitly forbids exposing email addresses, but lacks sanitization for potential prompt injection content within the commit or PR text.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of multiple shell commands and local scripts to gather data and perform its release tasks.
- Execution patterns: The skill uses
git,npm view, andghCLI tools. It also executes project-specific local scripts including./scripts/draft-stable-notes.shand./scripts/release.sh. These operations are consistent with the primary purpose of a release management skill.
Audit Metadata