terminal-bench-loop
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from multiple external sources to drive its logic and command execution, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads the 'benchmark command' and 'dispatch runner config' from a top-level loop issue description or a 'source issue' (Step 1). It also parses benchmark artifacts such as
results.jsonl, manifests, and Harbor job folders, as well as Paperclip issue comments for diagnosis (Step 3 and 4). - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands or markers within the ingested benchmark data or issue descriptions.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to execute shell commands (e.g.,
pnpm,uvx harbor), write planning/diagnosis documents, and create or update issues based on analyzed data. - Sanitization: The instructions do not specify sanitization or validation of the benchmark command or artifact content before execution or processing.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of shell commands provided in issue descriptions.
- Evidence: In Step 3, the agent is instructed to run a 'benchmark command' verbatim as recorded on the loop issue, while pinning environment variables like
PAPERCLIPAI_CMDto entrypoints within a worktree. This poses a risk if an attacker provides a malicious command in the source issue. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill involves running code from a worktree that is being actively modified as part of the fix loop.
- Evidence: The workflow requires executing the CLI entrypoint within an isolated Paperclip App worktree after applying fixes (Step 6 and 7), which is a form of executing dynamically modified content.
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