screenshot
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 30, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
take_screenshot.pyscript executes various system binaries, includingscreencaptureon macOS andscrotorimporton Linux, using thesubprocessmodule to perform screen captures. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill documentation recommends running the Windows helper script
take_screenshot.ps1with the-ExecutionPolicy Bypassflag, which circumvents system-level PowerShell script execution restrictions. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes dynamic execution for OS integration.
take_screenshot.pyexecutes Swift scripts (macos_permissions.swift,macos_window_info.swift) via theswiftinterpreter. Additionally,take_screenshot.ps1uses theAdd-Typecmdlet to compile and load C# code at runtime to access native Windows API methods for window management and screen capture. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: As the skill captures and displays visual system information to the agent, it creates a surface for indirect prompt injection. Malicious instructions displayed on a user's screen (e.g., in a browser or text editor) could be interpreted by the AI as valid commands. \n * Ingestion points: Screen captures generated by
take_screenshot.pyandtake_screenshot.ps1are ingested into the agent's context. \n * Boundary markers: There are no explicit markers or warnings instructing the AI to ignore content found within the captured images. \n * Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell execution and file system writes via its capture scripts. \n * Sanitization: The Python script performs minimal sanitization, such as rudimentary quote escaping for application names, before passing them to system commands.
Audit Metadata