integrations
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from external sources that could potentially be manipulated to influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads tool names, descriptions, and execution results from external plugins via
superset mcp toolsandsuperset mcp call-tool. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or safety instructions are defined to help the agent distinguish between tool metadata and instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
Bash(superset mcp:*)andBash(superset plugins:*)to perform actions in connected integrations. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or structural validation performed on the text returned by external plugin servers.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
supersetCLI to interact with external integrations. It includes explicit instructions to protect user data by using standard input for credentials, which prevents sensitive information from appearing in shell history or process management tools likeps. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Static analysis flagged a concealment pattern regarding the use of stdin for secrets. Manual review confirms this is a standard security best practice to prevent credential leakage in logs and not a malicious attempt to hide agent activities from the user.
Audit Metadata