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Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructs the agent to process reader comments from published pages and modify the original HTML source code accordingly. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where a malicious reader can influence the agent's behavior.\n
- Ingestion points: Reader comments retrieved via the
superset pages comments listcommand and presented in the prompt.\n - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define boundary markers or provide warnings to ignore instructions within the comments.\n
- Capability inventory: The agent can execute shell commands via the
supersetCLI and modify local files.\n - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation is performed on the comment content before it is used to direct source code edits.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
supersetcommand-line tool for publishing, storage management, and comment handling, with access restricted to thesupersetnamespace via the Bash tool.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill transmits local assets and HTML content to the external domainsupersetusercontent.com(a vendor-owned resource) during the publication process. Documentation also notes that published pages can be designed to exfiltrate tool output to third-party domains, although the default platform policy attempts to restrict this.
Audit Metadata