agentica-infrastructure

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The Agentica infrastructure API specification defines a high-surface-area environment for multi-agent coordination, which is susceptible to indirect prompt injection where data from one agent influences another.
  • Ingestion Points: The framework includes BlackboardCache (blackboard.py) for message passing between agents, SharedContext (claude_scope.py) for file operation logging and caching, and CoordinationDB (coordination.py) for tracking broadcasts and tasks. These components ingest data from multiple agents that may be processing untrusted external content.
  • Boundary Markers: The documentation does not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings for data retrieved from the shared blackboard or memory services.
  • Capability Inventory: The create_claude_scope function in claude_scope.py explicitly includes high-privilege capabilities such as bash, write_file, and edit_file in the agent execution environment, which could be targeted by injected instructions.
  • Sanitization: The specification lacks explicit details on sanitization, validation, or escaping of the natural language (prose) or formal content passed through the SharedContextEntry or HandoffState structures.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation for claude_scope.py indicates the provision of a bash tool within the standard execution scope for agents using this infrastructure, representing a significant capability surface for command execution.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 18, 2026, 05:11 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — agentica-infrastructure