explore
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The troubleshooting section instructs the agent to install the
llm-tldrpackage from external registries usinguvorpip. This introduces a dependency on third-party code that is not pinned or verified within the skill's own manifest. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically constructs shell commands by interpolating user-supplied variables such as
FOCUS,ENTRY, andPATH(e.g.,tldr search "${FOCUS}"). This pattern is susceptible to command injection if the input strings contain shell metacharacters and are not properly sanitized by the execution environment. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to ingest and analyze untrusted codebase content, creating a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection. Malicious instructions embedded in the code being explored could potentially influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Codebase files and directory structures accessed via
Read,Grep,Glob, and varioustldrutility commands. - Boundary markers: The skill does not define specific delimiters or warnings to treat ingested code content as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to powerful tools including
Bash,Write, andTask(for spawning sub-agents), which increases the potential impact of a successful injection. - Sanitization: There is no explicit logic for sanitizing or escaping content retrieved from the codebase before it is processed or summarized by the agent.
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