frontend-component-fix
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from local project source files (React components, CSS, parent components) and user-supplied bug descriptions during the diagnosis phase. Malicious instructions or hidden prompts embedded in these files could potentially influence the agent's reasoning or the resulting fix plan.
- Ingestion points: Bug descriptions, component source files, story files, and related styling/parent files processed in
SKILL.md(Steps 1, 2, and 4). - Boundary markers: The skill does not employ explicit delimiters or system instructions to disregard embedded commands within the ingested source code.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands via
Bash, write files to$JAAN_OUTPUTS_DIR, and trigger subsequent skills through theTasktool (e.g.,dev-output-integrate). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering or sanitization of external content before it is interpolated into the agent's diagnostic context.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes
sourceto load internal utility scripts (id-generator.sh,index-updater.sh) located within the${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}. It also performs standard directory operations likemkdirandstatvia theBashtool. These operations are restricted to the plugin's own library paths and the designated output directory, representing standard internal functionality.
Audit Metadata