grpo-finetune
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.runinrun_pipeline.pyto execute a local demonstration script (agent_demo.py). While this is a common pattern for integrated workflows, it involves shell execution of local files. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied datasets (
.jsonlfiles) for model training and evaluation. Maliciously crafted prompts within these datasets could influence the agent's behavior during the evaluation phase if the dataset contains instructions aimed at the agent itself rather than the model being trained. - Ingestion points:
run_pipeline.pyreads data from paths provided in--trainand--evalarguments. - Boundary markers: The prompt construction in
run_evaladds a/no-thinktag but lacks robust boundary markers to separate untrusted data from system instructions. - Capability inventory: The skill can execute local scripts via
subprocess.run, write to the filesystem, and perform network requests to Fireworks AI and OpenRouter APIs. - Sanitization: The script performs standard JSON parsing but does not sanitize the content of the messages for potential injection patterns before sending them to the API.
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill instructions and code (
run_pipeline.py,agent_demo.py) explicitly reference loading sensitive API keys (FIREWORKS_API_KEY,OPENROUTER_API_KEY) from a local.envfile. While storing secrets in.envis a standard practice, the skill's reliance on these environmental secrets for core functionality is noted.
Audit Metadata