automate-me
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes potentially untrusted data from local transcript files (~/.claude/projects/ workspace-encoded path) to derive instructions for new agent skills.\n
- Ingestion points: Conversation transcripts are read from
~/.claude/projects/<encoded-cwd>/*.jsonlto identify recurring user patterns and working conventions.\n - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit prompt delimiters for parsing transcripts, but it mitigates risks by requiring signals to appear in at least two different history slices to be considered high-confidence.\n
- Capability inventory: Includes reading transcript files, writing new skill files to
~/.claude/skills/, and executinggitcommands (log, worktree, commit) for PR creation.\n - Sanitization: The skill employs the
unslopskill for prose discipline and mandates a human-in-the-loop review process using theAskUserQuestiontool before finalizing the draft.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executesgitcommands (git log,git worktree,git commit) to check history and manage the lifecycle of the created skill via pull requests. These operations are restricted to the local repository context and follow standard developer workflows.
Audit Metadata