automate-me
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a broad attack surface for indirect prompt injection by design, as it ingests untrusted content from chat transcripts to generate persistent instructions.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads JSONL transcripts from
~/.claude/projects/to identify user patterns (File: SKILL.md, Step 1). - Boundary markers: The skill does not define specific prompt delimiters for the mined data, though it instructs the agent to "Cross-check across slices before elevating a signal" to filter noise.
- Capability inventory: The skill can write new files to the filesystem (
.claude/skills/), execute git commands, and create Pull Requests. - Sanitization: No explicit content sanitization or escaping is mentioned for the mined data before it is incorporated into the drafted skill.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes local shell commands to manage version history and deployment workflows.
- Evidence: Uses
git logto determine the scope of history mining based on the last edit time (File: SKILL.md, Step 0). - Evidence: Instructs the agent to use
git worktreeandgit committo finalize and propose the generated skill (File: SKILL.md, Step 6).
Audit Metadata