interrogate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external code and diffs, which serves as an ingestion point for untrusted data that is then interpolated into prompts for other models.
- Ingestion points: As detailed in
SKILL.md(Step 1), the skill gathers context from user messages, PR descriptions, and the output ofgit diffcommands. - Boundary markers: The template in
references/reviewer-prompt.mduses markdown headers and blockquotes to separate the code from instructions, but lacks explicit warning text for the subagents to disregard instructions found within the code blocks. - Capability inventory: The risk of injection is significantly mitigated by the instructions in
SKILL.md(Step 3) to spawn all subagents withreadonly: true, which limits their environment to read-only operations and prevents them from making changes to the host system. - Sanitization: The skill does not perform automated sanitization of the input code/diff content before it is processed by the subagents.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes local shell commands to retrieve technical context for its review process.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdinstructs the agent to executegit diff main...HEADto capture changes on a feature branch. This is a standard and necessary operation for a code review tool. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill reads from a configuration file located in the user's home directory to determine its operating parameters.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mddirects the agent to read~/.claude/engineering-models.mdto identify the specific list of models to be used for the review. This access is limited to the tool's own configuration needs.
Audit Metadata