interrogate

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external code and diffs, which serves as an ingestion point for untrusted data that is then interpolated into prompts for other models.
  • Ingestion points: As detailed in SKILL.md (Step 1), the skill gathers context from user messages, PR descriptions, and the output of git diff commands.
  • Boundary markers: The template in references/reviewer-prompt.md uses markdown headers and blockquotes to separate the code from instructions, but lacks explicit warning text for the subagents to disregard instructions found within the code blocks.
  • Capability inventory: The risk of injection is significantly mitigated by the instructions in SKILL.md (Step 3) to spawn all subagents with readonly: true, which limits their environment to read-only operations and prevents them from making changes to the host system.
  • Sanitization: The skill does not perform automated sanitization of the input code/diff content before it is processed by the subagents.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes local shell commands to retrieve technical context for its review process.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md instructs the agent to execute git diff main...HEAD to capture changes on a feature branch. This is a standard and necessary operation for a code review tool.
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill reads from a configuration file located in the user's home directory to determine its operating parameters.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md directs the agent to read ~/.claude/engineering-models.md to identify the specific list of models to be used for the review. This access is limited to the tool's own configuration needs.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 9, 2026, 04:36 AM