prompting-fable

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 31, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill explicitly directs the agent to utilize shell access for delegating tasks to external processes. In delegation.md, it states, "say 'shell out' — the agent already has Bash," and provides specific examples of running non-interactive commands such as codex exec -s read-only.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The instructions describe a "wrapper pattern" in delegation.md where the agent is instructed to dynamically generate a "self-contained CLI prompt" and then "run it via Bash." This involves the runtime assembly and execution of commands, which can be difficult to audit for safety.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill design establishes a multi-step chain where output from an external, potentially untrusted source (a delegate model via CLI) is ingested into the primary agent's context.
    • Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through the output of shell commands in delegation.md.
    • Boundary markers: The skill suggests labeling output (e.g., {label: 'gpt-5.6:review-auth'}), but lacks robust delimiters or explicit instructions to ignore embedded commands within the delegate's report.
    • Capability inventory: The agent is granted capabilities including Bash execution, spawning subagents with the agent() tool, and file system operations using isolation: 'worktree'.
    • Sanitization: Beyond the suggestion to use a schema for structured output, there is no mention of sanitizing or filtering natural language content returned by the external delegate models.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Aug 31, 2026, 09:36 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — prompting-fable