setup-engineering
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The mandate defined in
assets/mandate.mduses high-urgency markers like<EXTREMELY_IMPORTANT>to instruct the agent to prioritize thepatina-modeskill as the primary entry point for all non-trivial engineering tasks, effectively overriding the agent's default task-routing logic. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides a shell script
scripts/install-machinery.shintended for user execution. This script performs file system manipulations, including directory creation and configuration file modification, using standard shell utilities likeawkandcat. - [PERSISTENCE]: The setup process modifies the user's global agent configuration file (
~/.claude/CLAUDE.md) to include a reference to the engineering model override sheet. This mechanism ensures that the skill's specific instructions and configurations are loaded automatically in every future session for that user. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes a workflow where the agent automatically ingests content from external files, creating a potential surface for instruction injection.
- Ingestion points: The global
~/.claude/CLAUDE.mdfile (via the@inclusion ofengineering-models.md). - Boundary markers: The mandate block in
CLAUDE.mdis delimited by HTML comments, but the included model override file lacks specific sanitization boundaries. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses file system write capabilities and script execution via the provided bash script.
- Sanitization: The skill generates the configuration file based on user prompts but does not perform rigorous validation or escaping of the written content.
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