ai-agent-orchestrator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The orchestrator framework allows agents to pass data to one another, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection. In the
Agent.executemethod inSKILL.md, externalinputandcontextare appended to the system prompt. WhileJSON.stringifyis used to format the context, there are no explicit boundary markers or instructions for the LLM to ignore potentially malicious commands embedded in the data (e.g., content scraped from the web by a research agent). - Ingestion points:
Agent.execute,SequentialOrchestrator.execute, andSupervisorOrchestrator.executeinSKILL.mdall process external or agent-generated strings. - Boundary markers: None present in the
buildSystemPromptimplementation. - Capability inventory: The agents utilize
ChatOpenAIfor reasoning,ioredisfor shared memory, and provided tools likesearchToolandwebScrapeTool(referenced in specialists.ts). - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of external data is performed before prompt interpolation.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
SupervisorOrchestratorinSKILL.mdusesJSON.parseon the string output returned by the supervisor LLM to determine the next agent and task. While this is a common pattern for structured output, it introduces a dependency on the LLM's output integrity. If the supervisor agent were influenced by malicious instructions in the task history, the parsed JSON could be used to manipulate the workflow execution flow.
Audit Metadata