langchain-workflow-builder
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill provides a template for a 'calculatorTool' that uses the unsafe
eval()function to process mathematical expressions derived from user input. - Evidence:
const result = eval(expression); // Use safer math parser in productionwithin thetools/custom.tssnippet inSKILL.md. - The use of
eval()on strings that may be influenced by user input or LLM generation creates a significant remote code execution risk, despite the inclusion of a warning comment. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements complex workflows that ingest untrusted external data, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill uses
DirectoryLoaderto ingest PDF, text, and JSON files, andPineconeStoreto retrieve context for RAG pipelines. - Boundary markers: The RAG prompt template (
rag/chain.ts) lacks clear delimiters or 'ignore' instructions for the{context}variable, which is populated from external documents. - Capability inventory: The agents constructed using these patterns have access to the
calculatorTool(which executeseval) and adbQueryToolcapable of performing database lookups. - Sanitization: The examples do not demonstrate sanitization or filtering of retrieved document content before it is interpolated into the system prompt.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation instructs users to execute shell commands to install dependencies.
- Evidence:
npm install langchain @langchain/openai @langchain/communityin the 'Installation' section ofSKILL.md. - While these are standard package installations, they involve local command execution as part of the setup process.
Audit Metadata