monorepo-ci-optimizer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a manual affected detection strategy in
scripts/get-affected.tsthat reads thenameproperty frompackage.jsonfiles within the repository. These extracted names are then passed to a GitHub Actions matrix strategy and interpolated directly into a shell command (pnpm --filter ${{ matrix.package }} test). If an attacker modifies apackage.jsonfile to include shell metacharacters in the name field, it could result in arbitrary command execution on the CI runner when the workflow triggers. - Ingestion points: The
getPackages()function inscripts/get-affected.tsreads and parsespackage.jsonfiles from thepackages/directory. - Boundary markers: No boundary markers or delimiters are used to wrap the package names when they are passed to the matrix or the shell command.
- Capability inventory: The
test-affectedjob executes shell commands via therunkey, providing a platform for command execution. - Sanitization: There is no validation or sanitization of the
package.jsonname field before it is used to filter commands in the shell environment. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The custom script
scripts/get-affected.tsuses thechild_process.execSyncmodule to execute Git commands (git diff). While the target branch defaults to a static value, this pattern involves executing system-level commands based on data derived from the repository environment.
Audit Metadata