embedding-pipeline-builder
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from external sources, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions inside documents could influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: The
DocumentLoader.loadFileandDocumentLoader.loadDirectorymethods inSKILL.mdread local file content, andWebLoader.loadUrlfetches content from external URLs. - Boundary markers: The pipeline lacks explicit boundary markers or instructions to treat loaded content as data only, potentially allowing the agent to follow instructions embedded within the indexed documents.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to read any local file path provided, fetch content from any URL, and send data to the OpenAI API for embedding generation.
- Sanitization: Text processing includes cleaning and normalization (whitespace, unicode, special characters) but does not include security-specific sanitization to filter out prompt injection patterns.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses Node.js filesystem APIs (
readFile,readdir) to access the local environment. - Evidence: The
DocumentLoaderclass usesfs/promisesto read files and directories recursively, which could be used to access sensitive system files if the agent is directed to an inappropriate path. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill performs network operations to fetch external data and send content to the OpenAI API.
- Evidence: The
WebLoaderclass uses thefetchAPI to retrieve content from arbitrary URLs, which could be leveraged for SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery) or simple data exfiltration if the agent is instructed to fetch sensitive internal resources.
Audit Metadata