claude-code-coding-agent
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary function is to execute an external binary (the Claude Code CLI) via shell commands.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdprovides templates for shell execution such asprintf '%s' "$TASK_PROMPT" | <launcher> --print --output-format stream-json --verbose. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides an interface that pipes untrusted data into an agentic tool, creating a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The
$TASK_PROMPTvariable inSKILL.mdandreferences/monitoring.mdis used as the primary input for the automated coding agent. - Boundary markers: There are no delimiters or specific instructions to the sub-agent to ignore potential instructions embedded within the processed data.
- Capability inventory: The skill explicitly enables tools like
Read,Grep, andGlobin restricted mode, and potentially broader filesystem and network capabilities in default mode. - Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or validation logic is present for the input piped into the CLI.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically assembles shell commands using variables for the launcher and the task prompt.
- Evidence: The execution logic relies on string interpolation of
<launcher>and$TASK_PROMPTinto a shell pipeline.
Audit Metadata