dispatch

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 31, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests external task definitions from project files, GitHub issues, and pull requests to parameterize the kickoff prompts for spawned worker sessions, creating a surface where untrusted data could influence agent behavior. • Ingestion points: Task files, GitHub issue content (via open_issue_session), and pull request descriptions (via open_pr_session) are read to generate worker instructions. • Boundary markers: The kickoff prompt template uses structural headers like 'What to do' and 'Constraints' to scope worker tasks, but lacks rigorous sanitization or explicit 'ignore' instructions to prevent the sub-agent from following commands embedded in the task data. • Capability inventory: The orchestrator possesses capabilities for session lifecycle management (create_session, delete_item), cross-session communication (send_session_message), and repository operations (git merge, create_pull_request). • Sanitization: The skill description does not outline any specific filtering, validation, or escaping logic for external task content before it is interpolated into worker prompts.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 31, 2026, 10:20 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — dispatch