diagnose
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 11, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill directly interpolates the user-supplied
$ARGUMENTSvariable into multiple shell commands across all diagnostic steps. This allows an attacker to execute arbitrary commands by providing a target string containing shell metacharacters (e.g.,example.com; whoami). - Evidence includes:
bash scripts/diagnostics/dns.sh $ARGUMENTS(Step 1)dig $ARGUMENTS A +noall +answer(Step 1)ping -c 4 $ARGUMENTS(Step 2)curl -sI --connect-timeout 5 http://$ARGUMENTS(Step 2)nc -zv $ARGUMENTS 22 2>&1(Step 2)mtr --report $ARGUMENTS(Step 4)- [DYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION]: The skill uses the
!command`` syntax to execute a shell command at the time the skill is loaded or displayed. - Evidence:
!test -f scripts/diagnostics/dns.sh && echo "YES" || echo "NO"`` in the Environment Detection section. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from external network sources (DNS records, HTTP headers, traceroute paths) and explicitly instructs the agent to "Interpret their text output directly." This creates a surface where a malicious target could serve content designed to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Output from network tools including
dig,curl,ping,nc,traceroute, andmtr(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None present; outputs are read directly into the context.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell execution (
bash), local file reading (cat .pentest/scope.json), and various network tools. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the external command output is performed before the agent processes it.
Audit Metadata