rd-initiation-review-zhcn
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external project proposals and research materials, which constitutes a potential attack surface for indirect prompt injection. Malicious instructions could be hidden within these documents to influence the agent's evaluation.
- Ingestion points: Processes project proposals, R&D reports, and innovation packages as specified in
SKILL.mdandtemplates/request-template.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions mandate a "Four-Layer Evidence Separation" strategy in
SKILL.mdto distinguish "Proposal Statements" from "External Evidence", "Inferences", and "Open Gaps". This is a significant mitigation strategy designed to prevent the agent from blindly following instructions or claims embedded in user data. - Capability inventory: The agent can perform local file read/write operations and use external search tools.
- Sanitization: The skill relies on logical grounding and evidence verification rather than technical sanitization to mitigate injection risks.
- [SAFE]: The skill uses well-known external research and search services (Exa, Tavily, Brave, Jina) to verify claims, which is consistent with its stated purpose of R&D review. These are documented neutrally as information sources.
- [SAFE]: The file operations are confined to a structured local directory (e.g.,
artifacts/rd-initiation-review/) and involve standard Markdown and CSV files for logging and reporting, which is standard behavior for an analytical agent.
Audit Metadata