tech-briefing
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 27, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions in
SKILL.md(Step 5) construct a shell command by interpolating user-provided company names and technical fields directly:python "<SKILL_DIR>/scripts/sogou_search.py" "{公司名} {技术领域}" 8. This pattern is susceptible to command injection if the input contains shell metacharacters such as semicolons or pipes. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a workflow where the agent writes a Python file (
v2_data.py) containing retrieved external data and then runs a separate script (build_report_v2.py) which imports this file. This mechanism effectively executes data as code, presenting a risk of arbitrary code execution if malicious payloads are ingested from external sources such as patent titles, news summaries, or academic literature. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from external sources including patent databases, academic literature, and web search results. This untrusted data is summarized by the agent and incorporated into reports.
- Ingestion points: Patent details from
mcp__zhihuiya__search_patent, literature frommcp__zhihuiya__search_literature, and news results fromsogou_search.py. - Capability inventory: Shell command execution via
pythoncalls and file writing to the user's document directory. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are used to separate untrusted external content from the agent's logic.
- Sanitization: Although the final HTML report uses escaping, the intermediate Python code generation step lacks safeguards against code injection.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
scripts/sogou_search.pyscript performs network requests tosogou.comto retrieve industry news data.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata