affinage
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from GitHub PR comments and review bodies to drive its decision-making logic.\n
- Ingestion points: Untrusted content is fetched from GitHub API endpoints
pulls/<pr>/commentsandpulls/<pr>/reviewsas described in theSKILL.mdflow.\n - Boundary markers: While the skill utilizes a sub-agent context gate to triage inputs, it lacks explicit boundary markers or instruction-ignoring delimiters for the raw comment text during the grading phase.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write local report files (
.cheese/affinage/pr-<n>.md), post replies back to GitHub (post-reply), and dispatch tasks to the/cureskill, which is capable of performing code modifications.\n - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, escaping, or validation of the external comment content before it is processed by the LLM to generate recommendations.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of local bundled scripts and the GitHub CLI tool to perform PR operations.\n
- Evidence: It invokes
python3 skills/affinage/scripts/affinage.pyzwith multiple subcommands (e.g.,pr-status,age-route,post-reply) and usesgh apiandgh pr viewfor interacting with the GitHub platform.
Audit Metadata