hard-cheese
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting untrusted user-supplied explanations and git diff data, which are then passed to a sub-agent for evaluation against the SOLO rubric.
- Ingestion points: The author's free-text explanation, git diff summaries, and optional artifact specifications (
.cheese/specs/<slug>.md) are all ingested and passed into the prompt context for the judge sub-agent. - Boundary markers: The sub-agent instructions in
references/judge-prompt.mdinclude a specific "Untrusted input rule" that explicitly directs the agent to treat the input data as non-instructional and to ignore any commands or manipulation attempts within those blocks. - Capability inventory: The sub-agent is restricted to a "no-tool" or "read-only" configuration with fresh context, limiting the potential impact of a successful injection. The main skill manages local file writes to the
.cheese/directory using a local Python application. - Sanitization: The skill relies on sub-agent prompting and instruction-following to mitigate injection risks rather than performing programmatic sanitization or filtering of the user-provided text.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a local Python zip application (
hard-cheese.pyz) to perform ranking, state management, and audit logging. - Evidence: Multiple steps in
SKILL.mdcallpython3 skills/hard-cheese/scripts/hard-cheese.pyzwith user-provided arguments like the artifact<slug>to check freshness, rank code hunks, and append results to the audit trail.
Audit Metadata