pasteurize
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted data from external sources, which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill accepts a raw
<input>(bug reports, stack traces, failing test output) inSKILL.mdand investigation requests containing asymptomfield. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit boundary markers or warnings to the agent to treat the ingested symptom data as untrusted when forming commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including executing shell commands via the
repro-rerunscript, writing files to the.cheese/directory, and potentially accessing external resources via the/briesearchtool. - Sanitization: There are no instructions for sanitizing or validating the input before it is interpolated into shell commands or hypothesis predictions.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's core functionality relies on executing arbitrary shell commands to build feedback loops and reproduce failures.
- Evidence: Phase 2 in
SKILL.mdexplicitly instructs the agent to run therepro-reruncommand with a user-defined or agent-derived--cmd. While this is the primary purpose of a debugging skill, it provides a mechanism for executing arbitrary code based on the content of a bug report.
Audit Metadata