plate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted local data such as git diffs and file contents to determine Pull Request structure and generate commit/PR metadata, which presents a surface for indirect prompt injection.\n
- Ingestion points: The skill reads
git status,git diff, and recent logs as described inSKILL.mdto classify work units.\n - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded within the code or diffs being processed.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities including executing shell commands via
git,gh,gt, andgit-town, as well as writing to the local filesystem (e.g.,docs/adr/and transient body files).\n - Sanitization: The skill logic does not include explicit sanitization or filtering of the ingested diff data before it is used to generate PR descriptions.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and provides instructions for installing several external developer tools from established sources, including the
github/gh-stackextension for the GitHub CLI,git-town, and the Graphite CLI (@withgraphite/graphite-cli).\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses various command-line utilities to manage the PR lifecycle. These includegitfor local operations,ghfor GitHub interactions, and stack providersgtandgit-townfor managing dependent PR chains. These actions are consistent with the skill's intended purpose.
Audit Metadata