press
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from external project files to define its testing scope and parameters, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious content in those files could influence the agent's actions during the adversarial loop.\n
- Ingestion points: The skill reads
.cheese/cook/<slug>.mdfor handoff instructions and.cheese/glossary/<slug>.mdfor canonical terms.\n - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to ignore potentially malicious embedded content within the ingested files.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands via
python3, write new files to the.cheese/press/directory, and execute dynamically generated test code.\n - Sanitization: The instructions do not specify any sanitization, validation, or escaping of the content read from the external files before it is processed.\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to dynamically generate and execute adversarial tests, fixtures, and test-only harness support at runtime based on the approved contract and handoff data.\n
- Evidence: The 'Adversarial loop' section explicitly instructs the agent to 'Add or run only tests, fixtures, and test-only harness support' and to 'Replay the same attack'.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes a local Python zip application (
press.pyz) to perform administrative tasks, resolving slugs and writing artifacts.\n - Evidence: Multiple instructions call for the execution of
python3 skills/press/scripts/press.pyzwith various subcommands likewheypoint-resolveandwrite-handoff-artifact.
Audit Metadata