wheypoint
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to capture and persist conversation state, which involves processing untrusted data that is later re-introduced into the agent's context.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.md(Step 1: Read user's words via theturnscommand) andreferences/work-graph.md(theimportcommand which loads external JSON bundles). - Boundary markers: Present. The skill uses structured Markdown projections with defined headers (
## Notes,## Directives,## Identifiers) as described in the "Handoff slug" section ofSKILL.mdto separate different types of state. - Capability inventory:
SKILL.md(Runtime commands) andreferences/commands.mddocument extensive file read/write and script execution capabilities viawheypoint.pyz.references/parallel-handoffs.mdfurther describes the ability to specify and execute arbitrary shell commands for task isolation. - Sanitization: Present.
SKILL.md(What the runtime enforces) explicitly states that the runtime refuses text matching credential patterns.references/work-graph.mddetails digest verification for links and bundles to ensure data integrity. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to execute a bundled Python zipapp (
wheypoint.pyz) with a wide array of subcommands to manage the checkpointing lifecycle. This includes operations for state validation, record forking, and data import/export. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: To perform its handoff duties, the skill accesses potentially sensitive information, including conversation transcripts, local file system paths (e.g.,
xdg:and absolute paths), and Git repository metadata. While this is necessary for the skill's purpose, it represents a data exposure surface if the state records are shared or exfiltrated via theexportcommand.
Audit Metadata