agents-docs
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill retrieves Markdown content from external documentation sites, which could potentially contain malicious instructions intended to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Documentation pages fetched from
code.claude.comanddevelopers.openai.comvia thefetch-doc.shscript or direct web fetch. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of clear delimiters or explicit "ignore embedded instructions" warnings when including the retrieved content in the prompt context.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to shell execution tools (
rg,codexCLI) and is instructed on how to modify local configuration files (e.g.,config.toml). - Sanitization: The
fetch-doc.shscript performs basic integrity checks (content markers and minimum file size) but does not sanitize the text for potential prompt injection patterns. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the agent to execute local scripts and system commands to process documentation and inspect the local environment.
- Evidence: The agent is instructed to run
scripts/fetch-doc.sh,rg, and variouscodexCLI commands such ascodex --version,codex features list, andcodex app-server generate-json-schema. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs network requests to fetch documentation artifacts from the internet.
- Evidence: The
fetch-doc.shscript usescurlto retrieve data fromdevelopers.openai.com,learn.chatgpt.com, andcode.claude.com. These downloads target well-known and expected domains related to the skill's stated purpose and use secure HTTPS protocols.
Audit Metadata