codex-handoff
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a custom Bash wrapper (
scripts/run-codex-handoff.sh) to execute thecodexCLI for both research and implementation tasks. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: Implementation subagents are launched with the
--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandboxflag. This configuration explicitly disables the AI agent's security sandbox and manual approval steps, granting subagents full permissions to read, modify, or delete any files accessible to the host user. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill automatically ingests instructions from 'companion skills' by reading
SKILL.mdfiles from local directories (~/.claude/skills/and~/.agents/skills/). The content from these files is directly incorporated into prompts for high-privilege subagents. * Ingestion points: Local filesystem paths for skill definitions. * Boundary markers: Although the skill instructions define authority boundaries for subagents, these boundaries are defined within prompts that include the potentially untrusted companion skill content. * Capability inventory: Subagents possess broad filesystem access and command execution capabilities due to the disabled sandboxing. * Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or safety filtering of the companion skill content before it is processed by the agent orchestrator.
Audit Metadata