Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface as it is designed to ingest and process content from untrusted external PDF files and JSON configuration files.\n
- Ingestion points: PDF content is read via
scripts/profile.py(metadata),scripts/form.py(form fields), and various recipes inreferences/recipes.md(text and table extraction).\n - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit boundary markers or delimiters to isolate extracted content from the agent's control stream.\n
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to read/write local files and execute shell commands via the provided scripts.\n
- Sanitization: While the scripts produce structured JSON, there is no evidence of specific sanitization of the document text to prevent embedded instructions from influencing the agent.\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: A documentation recipe in
references/recipes.mduses a Python heredoc to dynamically execute a script for table extraction using thepdfplumberlibrary. This is a form of dynamic script generation from a fixed template, which is generally acceptable but represents a dynamic execution pattern.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's Python scripts and documentation recipes execute several local shell commands (e.g.,qpdf,pdftotext,pdfinfo,pdfimages,ocrmypdf). These executions are implemented using safe patterns, such as list-based arguments forsubprocess.run(), and target well-known utility binaries.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses theuvpackage manager to dynamically install Python dependencies (pypdf,reportlab,pdfplumber) from official registries. These are well-known libraries and the versions are specified, representing standard package management behavior.
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